

INTRODUCTION

Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Nate Grubman

It had become commonplace to remark that the Arab countries constituted the only major world region largely impervious to the “third wave” of democratization, which began in 1974 and over the following decades brought down scores of authoritarian rulers throughout most of the world. This impression of “Arab exceptionalism” seemed to change dramatically, however, when the self-immolation of a fruit vendor in the city of Sidi Bouzid in December 2010 sparked a series of popular uprisings within Tunisia that quickly spilled over into other countries in the region. Strikingly, the protesters mostly invoked not religious, sectarian, or anti-Western themes, but universal principles of human dignity, freedom, and democracy.

Within a month, longtime Tunisian dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was ousted from power. Less than a month after that, Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak was forced to step down after almost thirty years at the helm. And following a civil war and NATO intervention in Libya, strongman Muammar Qadhafi was toppled as well.

Large popular protests also broke out in other Arab countries: Yemen, where longtime President Ali Abdallah Saleh finally agreed to resign in accordance with a plan negotiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and a national-dialogue conference is under way; Bahrain, where a GCC military intervention helped to preserve the status quo in the face of massive protests; Syria, where Bashar al-Assad’s regime still survives as a brutal civil war rages; Morocco, where reforms put forward by the king and approved by a popular referendum helped to quiet protests at least for a while; Algeria, where a combination of repression and financial inducements preserved the regime in power; and, on a smaller scale, even Saudi Arabia and some of its Gulf neighbors, where generous new government-funded benefits helped to forestall the growth of unrest.

This chain of events, which became widely referred to as the “Arab Spring,” occurred with extraordinary rapidity, and its ramifications are far from over. Efforts to build democracy continue in those states—Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen—that succeeded in bringing down

their authoritarian rulers, but these transitions have been encountering not only surprising twists and turns but some massive bumps in the road. We are still in the middle of the story, or quite possibly even in its early chapters. So it is a somewhat rash undertaking to offer an edited volume on this topic when so much is still in flux.

The articles gathered here originally appeared in the *Journal of Democracy*, all but one in July 2011 or later—that is, after the Arab Spring had begun.¹ The *Journal* has devoted many of its pages to the region during these past three years, and within the limits of a quarterly publication, we have tried to make our coverage as timely as possible. But that also means that some of the essays in this collection, which were published at earlier stages of the Arab Spring, may now appear in some respects outdated. (The issue of the *Journal* in which a chapter originally appeared is noted at the outset of each essay.) Nonetheless, we believe not only that the slightly older essays contain much analysis that is still valuable, but also that their inclusion here will help readers to see how various developments during the Arab Spring were regarded at the time they occurred. In spite of the difficulties of dealing with a moving target, we concluded that it was important to make available a book on this subject at a time when readers (and teachers) are eager for materials offering serious analysis of these remarkable changes in the Arab world.

The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule

As the essays in this volume demonstrate, the Arab Spring both reflected and accelerated a significant shift in the political culture of the Arab world. Evidence of this shift had been gathering for many years in advance of the eruption of prodemocracy protests in Tunisia in December 2010. Intellectually, a variety of justifications for authoritarian rule—anticolonial, developmental, socialist, Marxist, and Arab-nationalist, among others—had gradually fallen by the wayside. So had the willingness to excuse or legitimate authoritarian rule on the basis of the charismatic leadership of an individual such as Qadhafi. In place of a lot of failed “isms,” there emerged a new explanation for stagnation in the Arab world—namely, that the absence of freedom and the dearth of genuine means for holding political leaders accountable had led Arab societies to a profound developmental cul-de-sac. Arab scholars, thinkers, and civil society activists from diverse ideological orientations (aside from extreme Islamists who rejected the legitimacy of any political authority not strictly based on the word and will of Allah) became increasingly outspoken about the need for democratic reform. In the first *Arab Human Development Report* in 2002, a team of Arab scholars iden-

tified the “freedom deficit” as a barrier to “human development.”² They observed:

There can be no real prospects for reforming the system of governance, or for truly liberating human capabilities, in the absence of comprehensive political representation in effective legislatures based on free, honest, efficient, and regular elections. If the people’s preferences are to be properly expressed and their interests properly protected, governance must become truly representative and fully accountable.³

Well before the Arab Spring, exhaustion with authoritarian rule was also spreading, particularly in the largest Arab country, Egypt. Six years before the January 25 Revolution (marking the date on which Egypt’s 2011 uprising began), there had emerged a protest movement—Kifaya (Enough)—that demanded an end to the indefinite reelection of President Hosni Mubarak and a cessation of the apparent campaign to smooth the path for his son Gamal to succeed him. By mid-2005, many Egyptians were openly calling for Mubarak’s ouster, and a combination of societal mobilization and U.S. pressure forced the dictator to allow a multicandidate (though still not free and fair) presidential election that September. Two and a half years later, a new generation of Internet-savvy youth activists rallied behind aggrieved Egyptian workers to organize a general strike on 6 April 2008, stunning the regime and badly denting its legitimacy and self-confidence.

While Egypt led the way in protests, it was not alone. Shortly after the assassination by car bomb of Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, tens and later hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of Beirut to demand the withdrawal of Syrian forces. Rallying under the banner of “Freedom, Sovereignty, Independence,” the protestors compelled the withdrawal of Syrian troops and then in midyear elections helped Hariri allies win control of government. Shortly after this “Cedar Revolution” in Lebanon, about fifty-thousand demonstrators in tiny Bahrain (population 1.2 million) turned out to demand constitutional reform of the country’s authoritarian monarchy, and protests continued to erupt repeatedly thereafter.

These stirrings of popular mobilization for democratic change were beaten back by intensified repression in Egypt and elsewhere. But they were also deflated by sobering demonstration effects from other Arab experiments with “democracy.” In Iraq, the overthrow of the region’s most ruthless dictatorship by a U.S. invasion was seen as bringing not greater political freedom and choice but rather sectarian polarization, economic chaos, and civil war (which was claiming the lives of a hundred Iraqis a day by early 2007). In Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Yemen, autocracies that had cautiously granted more political space to the opposition as a periodic gesture of what Daniel Brumberg has called “tactical liberalization”⁴ now eagerly seized back that recently opened

real estate, pointing to the chaos in Iraq. Arab autocrats warned the West and key constituencies in their own societies that the big beneficiaries of any further political opening would be Islamist political parties. Apparently bolstering this argument were the strong showing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt's November 2005 parliamentary elections, the victory (albeit with less than 45 percent of the vote) of the militant Islamist movement Hamas in the January 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, and the electoral strength of both Sunni and Shia Islamists in Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain.

These setbacks, however, do not appear to have altered the deeper currents of cultural change in the Arab world. What evidence we have of mass public opinion indicates a surprisingly widespread general aspiration for democracy, first measured systematically in the Arab Barometer surveys of 2006–2007 and confirmed by the second-round surveys four years later. As Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins note in chapter 6, not only has public support for “a democratic system of government” been remarkably high (between 83 and 96 percent) across a number of countries in North Africa and the Middle East, but these high levels have been sustained between the earlier stirrings of protest in 2006–2007 and the onset of the Arab Spring in 2010–11. Of course, this is not the whole story. The Arab Barometer also found persistent and broad (even overwhelming) agreement that “reform should proceed gradually,” as well as limited (and between the two rounds of surveys, declining) support for basic premises of political Islam. It also revealed other aspects of Arab political culture, such as generally low trust and civic engagement, that are unfavorable for democracy.

We thus should not underestimate how hard it will be to overcome the legacies of authoritarian rule. In fact, the more extreme the tyranny, the more difficult it proves for society to establish key cultural foundations of democracy such as trust, tolerance, broad participation, and a strong inclination to keep politics peaceful. The more extreme the tyranny, the more difficult it is to topple it without violence, and the more likely the state is to shatter completely when the dictatorship falls. Iraq and Libya both confront the fundamental dilemma of all postconflict transitions: No country can have a democratic state unless it first has a state that commands a monopoly over the means of organized violence. Should Syria's civil war end with the toppling of the Assad regime or its negotiated exit, the new regime in Syria will face this same existential challenge.

More generally, democratic change following decades of authoritarian rule is rarely swift and certain. Where there is little experience with democracy and an absence of other facilitating conditions—a large middle class, moderate levels of inequality, high levels of education, and a democratic neighborhood—the struggle to build democracy is likely to

TABLE—REGIME CLASSIFICATION AND FREEDOM HOUSE SCORES OF 16 ARAB COUNTRIES, 2010–12

Regime Type (2012)	Countries	FH Score for 2010		FH Score for 2012	
		PR	CL	PR	CL
Electoral Democracy	Tunisia	7	5	3 ▲	4 ▲
Electoral Authoritarian	Lebanon	5	3	5	4 ▼
	Iraq	5	6	6 ▼	6
	Libya	7	7	4 ▲	5
	Egypt	6	5	5 ▲	5
	Yemen	6	5	6	6 ▼
Competitive Monarchy	Kuwait	4	4 ▼	5 ▼	5
	Morocco	5	4	5	4
Authoritarian Monarchy	Bahrain	6	5	6	6 ▼
	UAE	6	5	6	6
	Oman	6	5	6	5
	Qatar	6	5	6	5
	Jordan	6	5	6	5
	Saudi Arabia	7	6	7	7 ▼
Civil-War State	Syria	7	6	7	7 ▼

Note: Regime classifications are our own. PR and CL stand for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most-free and 7 the least-free rating.

▲ ▼ indicate a change in PR or CL ratings since the last survey.

be difficult and protracted. In two-thirds of the Arab states, heavy dependence on oil and gas revenues adds another severe handicap, swelling the state, distorting the economy, and stunting the emergence of citizenship. Given these hurdles, there are various ways in which a country in transition may fall short of attaining democracy: It may experience a messy period of “competitive authoritarianism”; it may fall victim to a restoration of the old regime; it may suffer a military coup; and violent conflict is yet another possibility. As we see in the Table above, according to Freedom House a few Arab countries improved their levels of political rights and civil liberties during the first two years of the Arab Spring, but seven countries saw a decline in freedom during this period versus just three that realized a gain.

Tunisia stands out for having achieved the most successful transition of any Arab country thus far. Freedom House, in its 2012 and 2013 year-end surveys of *Freedom in the World*, has classified it as a democracy.⁵ Yet as we completed work on this volume in late 2013, Tunisians still had not forged an agreement on their constitutional future, and even this most promising of all the Arab transitions remained stuck in a period of tension and uncertainty. The other case of success in peacefully toppling autocracy, Egypt, flipped backward into failure as a result of the authoritarian excesses of both elected Islamist president Mohamed Morsi and the military, which on 3 July 2013 removed the president and suspended the constitution in response to massive anti-Morsi public protests. While some kind of constitutional veneer may

soon be restored in Egypt, the effort to build democracy there appears to have been set back by many years.

Several other regimes in the region hold competitive multiparty elections with some degree of uncertainty as to the results. But in each case the system falls well short of democracy. Libya has political pluralism, but the Libyan state lacks sufficient authority. Lebanon may come closest, but its political landscape is distorted by coercion, regional interference, and entrenched sectarianism. Iraq might have moved toward greater democracy, but under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki it has instead sunk deeper into authoritarian and sectarian patterns. Of the monarchies, Morocco is the most liberal, but as Ahmed Benchemsi maintains in chapter 27, recent political reforms have not altered the fundamental logic of kingly rule, which remains ultimately unaccountable to the people or the rule of law. Yemen could reach democracy if its national dialogue proves able to broker a viable constitutional agreement regarding the country's political structure and the division of power among geographic regions and groups. But as April Longley Alley argues in chapter 22, this imperative faces formidable challenges.

If there is one thing that the Arab Spring has taught us, however, it is to allow for the element of surprise. Despite the rising frequency of prodemocracy protests in the Arab world in the first decade of this century, few analysts foresaw that popular revolutions would topple four Arab autocrats at the start of its second decade. In the wake of the Arab Spring, many authoritarian regimes may endure for some time to come, but they seem unlikely to enjoy the levels of stability and acceptance that they once did. The course of democratic protest and change in the Arab world is still in its very early stages.

Islam and Democracy

This volume consists of two parts: The first half contains sixteen chapters that offer a regionwide analysis of what has been transpiring in the Arab world. A number of them focus on the role of Islam and ask what it means if Islamist parties come to power. Others focus on the differences among Arab states and seek causes and patterns that will help to explain why events have unfolded so differently in various countries. Some focus on culture and public opinion in the Arab world. Still others trace the role of particular factors such as digital media, military and security forces, or electoral systems. And several compare the Arab Spring to earlier historical examples of rapidly spreading international revolts such as the revolutions of 1848 and 1989 in Europe.

The second half of this volume takes a case-study approach via thirteen chapters, each of which examines developments in a specific Arab country. As might be expected, multiple chapters are devoted to Tunisia

and Egypt, the two countries that launched the Arab Spring, but most of the major Arab states receive a chapter of their own.⁶

Part I opens with a series of chapters analyzing the relationship between Islam and democracy in the context of the Arab Spring. In the opening chapter, Abdou Filali-Ansary writes that the Arabs have begun to speak “a new language of politics.” With the diffusion of this language—replete with references to democracy, human rights, civil society, and states bound by the rule of law—democratic legitimacy has become the only type of political authority that Arab peoples now accept. In the context of this new language, the rise of political Islam and the calls for *shari‘a* (Islamic law) that have accompanied it may appear incongruous. After all, as Filali-Ansary concedes, some who call for *shari‘a* have a very narrow interpretation of the word that contradicts the emergent democratic spirit: They view it as a “catalogue of prescriptions” delineated by “an uncritical and closed-minded brand of traditional religious scholarship.” But to others, *shari‘a* takes on a far broader meaning in the context of Muslim and Arab history: a system that has protected citizens from arbitrary or despotic rule by binding the hands of the ruler. In this sense, the call for *shari‘a* is a cry for “basic decency,” and the rise of political Islamists, who suffered great repression under the region’s strongmen in the aftermath of what appeared to be secular uprisings, is not so surprising. While Filali-Ansary contends that democratic legitimacy is the only kind that has broad appeal today, he warns that this does not preclude the return of some sort of *Weltanschauung* politics in the future, imposed either by Islamists or by intolerant secularists.

The period that has followed the Arab uprisings has been punctuated by alternating moments of great hope and deep despair. But as Olivier Roy writes in chapter 2, “something irreversible did happen in the Arab Spring” and “democratization is becoming rooted in Arab societies.” Demographic and technological changes have allowed young people to acquire greater education, to connect with one another, and to challenge traditional norms of societal organization. According to Roy, “The new generation calls for debate, freedom, democracy, and good governance,” rather than for a charismatic leader claiming exclusive access to the road to utopia. This means that not only would a modern-day Gamal Abdel Nasser have trouble rising to power but an Arab Khomeini as well. Religion has become more of a personal choice, and the realm of Islam has become more pluralistic. To Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, salafists are not faithful foot soldiers in the political struggle against secularists; rather, they are potential political rivals within the broad tent of political Islam. Given these changes, even Islamists who may see democracy less as a desirable political system than as a vehicle by which an Islamic state may be reached are likely to find themselves constrained and forced to play by democracy’s rules. Lacking a security

apparatus or, especially in Egypt or Tunisia, the rents to build one powerful enough to impose their agenda on an unwilling society, Islamists have few alternatives to turning their movements into political parties, seeking to broaden their constituencies, eschewing dogma for values-based appeals, and consistently defending democracy as an institution. In Roy's words, "Islamists have changed, or at least they have understood that the world has changed."

In chapter 3, Hillel Fradkin disputes this notion, writing that the factors binding Islamists to democracy may not be as constricting as Roy portrays them. Indeed, as Fradkin argues, Egypt's revolutionary condition ensures that the contours of its political system are still very much under negotiation (Fradkin was writing before the July 2013 coup that unseated Morsi). During its time in power, the Muslim Brotherhood showed an ability to reshape its political environment. In the end, Fradkin argues, the Brotherhood's ability to manipulate the constraints upon it and shape the revolution will depend on "how well [Brotherhood leaders] understand the politically relevant terrain, how intelligent they are in exploiting it, and how much in the way of resources they can bring to bear." Fradkin concedes that Egyptian society might be changing in a way that makes impossible the Brotherhood's goal of establishing an Islamist state. Even at the apex of its power, however, the organization offered no indication that it intended to abandon its strategy, organization, or mission of establishing an Islamic government. Absent these indications, the commitment of Islamists to democracy as a desirable system of government will always be shrouded in doubt.

In chapter 4, Roy responds that the Brotherhood, despite its stated ideology, is more of a conservative organization than a revolutionary movement. As Roy writes, "Seventy years of cautious politics hardly qualify a movement as revolutionary." The Brotherhood at times earned the tacit acceptance of past Egyptian governments partially because it never seemed bent on rocking the boat. Its apparent surprise at the January 25 uprising against President Hosni Mubarak shows that revolution in pursuit of an Islamic state was at most on the backburner. While the Brotherhood displayed a taste for power, it did not, according to Roy, pursue the kinds of revolutionary changes to Egypt's laws and institutions that might establish an Islamic government. Its members continue to refer to the group's historical strategy and mission, but "there is a growing discrepancy between ideological references and real practices." In Roy's view, even a Brotherhood that could hold on to power would have little chance of making Egypt go the way of Iran. The Brotherhood had no charismatic leader to play the role of Khomeini, and it controlled no security apparatus to rival Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Perhaps most important, "all political leaders at the very least pay lip service to democracy." According to Roy, the Muslim Brotherhood had no designs for dramatically altering a society in which it was deeply rooted; as the

society moved in a more pluralistic, democracy-friendly direction, so too would the Brotherhood.

In chapter 5, Husain Haqqani draws on Pakistan's experience to shed light on the debate about Islamists and democracy. Haqqani argues that Islamists tend to see democracy simply as majority rule, an especially problematic take on this form of government in societies with sizeable ethnic and religious minorities and high levels of polarization. In Egypt and Tunisia, Islamist leaders may talk as if they harbor an unwavering commitment to democracy, even if in the future democratic institutions might allow popularly elected secularist leaders to pass laws that contradict Islamic law. But as long as Islamists are holding the reins of power, such talk is cheap. For Haqqani, "the real test of the Islamists' commitment to democracy will come not while they are in power for the first time, but when they lose subsequent elections." The historical ambivalence of Islamists toward participating in democratic politics offers little indication as to how they will handle this test. The experience of Pakistan—the only country in which governing Islamists were ousted at the ballot box—offers little reason for optimism. Confined to the opposition by a string of electoral defeats since General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq's Islamist-friendly regime ended in 1988, Pakistan's Islamists have resorted to galvanizing their supporters to apply extralegal pressure—violent protests, assassinations, and coups—to ensure that elected leaders maintain Islamic laws. As Haqqani concludes, "There are legitimate grounds to suspect that what mainstream Islamists actually seek is a dictatorship of the pious."

Public Opinion and Culture

The longer-term prospects of democratization in the Arab world will hinge on the depth and breadth of support for democracy among the region's citizens. In chapter 6, Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins analyze the results of two recent waves of the Arab Barometer public-opinion survey, the first conducted in 2006–2007 and the second in 2011–12. The authors find that popular support for democracy has been consistently robust, exceeding 80 percent in every country in which the survey was administered. Drilling further down, however, they note that some of the norms critical to a democratic society—trust, political interest, and involvement in political and civil society organizations—enjoy comparatively tepid support. It is unclear whether these attitudes have fostered authoritarianism or whether authoritarian rule has fostered these attitudes. With regard to citizens' views of religion and politics, there exists a broad consensus that laws should be consistent with *shari'a*, but respondents increasingly have expressed an aversion to religious figures intervening in the political system.

In chapter 7, Hicham Ben Abdallah El Alaoui sheds further light on

the cultural backdrop against which Arab political development is taking place. El Alaoui holds that culture, as an incubator for ideology, will have a far more profound impact on Arab politics than the laws passed by legislatures. Despite the traditionally hostile attitudes of Islamic scholars toward secular culture, El Alaoui argues that part of “Islam’s grandeur has been its ability to absorb myriad cultural influences.” Yet this norm of openness has in recent years been challenged by the rise of salafism, which has “become the central signifier of resistance to Westernization and neocolonialism.” This norm consists of a set of prescriptions and proscriptions based on strict interpretation of religious texts. Whereas Arab nationalists once fought vigorously against dogmatic religiosity, today’s secular voices are far meeker. The rise of salafism occurs at the same time that many Arabs are increasingly consuming “profane and basically secular cultural products via television, videos, the Internet, and popular literature.” Rising levels of education along with increasingly powerful media have offered access to these cultural creations to a growing number of Arabs, but this flowering of secular culture has been confined largely to the home. In public, the salafist norm is winning the day.

El Alaoui finds the roots of salafism entangled with those of authoritarianism. By confining culture to the realm of private distraction and paying homage to public conservatism, Arab autocrats have sought to decrease the probability of challenges to their rule. By quietly allowing the rise of a conservative, anti-Western religious movement, Arab autocrats have been able to portray themselves to the West as bulwarks against Islamist bogeymen. Even intellectuals opposed to authoritarianism could be induced to align with the lesser evil of secular autocrats. Other intellectuals have seemingly chosen political withdrawal, treating cultural production as a substitute for political activity. If Arab intellectuals and artists are to leave their mark on their countries’ political systems, they will have to launch a challenge against the salafist paradigm.

Explaining Divergent Outcomes

The centrality of religion in the Arab world presents new questions for scholars of democracy because, as Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz point out in chapter 8, conflicts over religion played little role in the third wave of democratization. Nonetheless, the early progress of Tunisia’s democratic transition and the examples of Muslim democracy in other parts of the world give Stepan and Linz reasons to believe that Islam will not hinder democratization. As they emphasize, democracy does not require a strict separation of mosque and state but rather the embrace of the “twin tolerations,” an understanding that “religious authorities do not control democratic officials who are acting constitution-

ally, while democratic officials do not control religion so long as religious actors respect other citizens' rights." Stepan and Linz argue that the relative success of democracy in Albania, India, Indonesia, Senegal, and Turkey—together home to half a billion Muslims—provides strong evidence against Muslim exceptionalism. In each, state and religious officials have together forged consensus on policy.

But Stepan and Linz find a different barrier: Some of the new regimes emerging in the Arab world are "authoritarian-democratic hybrids." In such regimes, political leaders feel constrained by popular opinion to make room for certain features of democracy, including elections. Yet leading actors also are prepared to resort to authoritarian approaches when they feel that these are critical to pursuing their goals. In Egypt, the military, the Muslim Brothers, and liberal secularists all at some point have advocated nondemocratic means of ensuring that their competitors do not grow too powerful. Tunisia, by contrast, has largely avoided this brand of politics, thanks to the moderate leadership of the Ennahda party, the agreements reached between Tunisian Islamists and secularists, and the relative maturity of Tunisian political society. Stepan and Linz also examine the varieties of "sultanism" that have prevailed in Arab countries, and argue that the more sultanistic the prerevolutionary regime, the greater are the obstacles to democratization—a finding that bodes ill for Libya and Syria. Despite the challenges, Stepan and Linz conclude that "the events of the Arab Spring at the very least have made Arab 'presidents for life' increasingly unacceptable, and the dignity of citizens increasingly desired."

In chapter 9, Daniel Brumberg examines the persistence of authoritarian governing arrangements and the problems that they pose for transitions to democracy. In Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, elites are trying to renegotiate the agreements that held authoritarian systems together. As Brumberg puts it, "The challenge is to make sure that these compromises help rather than hinder democratization." Part of the difficulty in constructing a new pact is that those who benefited from the old one now lack the support to win elections, and thus are fearful of relinquishing power to the voters; at the same time, those who were disadvantaged by the old pact see no need to compromise because they are now in a position to win elections. Brumberg predicts that "the difficulties of shifting from an autocratic to a democratic model for protecting different societal interests will preoccupy the Arab world for the coming decade and beyond." Arab autocrats have long stoked the fears of minority groups—including Sunnis in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Alawites and Christians in Bashar al-Assad's Syria, and secular elites in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia—warning that democracy would unleash a harsh form of majority rule guaranteed to render them second-class citizens or worse. The government-citizen pacts built on these fears took different shapes in various corners of the Arab world.

In Egypt, leaders carefully sought to maintain an equilibrium among many interest groups. Elsewhere, as in Syria, leaders sought to repress a majority identity group.

These arrangements began breaking down in 2011, as broad swaths of society, organized by a generation of youth activists and enraged by the increasingly repressive security tactics of insecure regimes, began to turn on their former protectors. But the logic and organizing principles of what Brumberg calls “protection-racket politics” could not easily be abandoned. In Egypt, the military continued to be a key arbiter, the judiciary remained politicized, and neocorporatist structures persisted. Two months after Mubarak stepped down, as Egyptians headed to the polls to vote on a set of constitutional amendments, a major fault line began to appear between the secular and Islamist Egyptians who had not long before stood together in Tahrir Square. As the rift widened into a chasm, nondemocratic actors found themselves with plenty of room to operate. In Tunisia, meanwhile, fear-mongering about a coming Islamist revolution proved less of an obstacle to pact-making. The lack of a military or judicial arbiter forced Tunisian parties to talk directly to one another about their disagreements. The negotiations have been arduous and at times have seemed doomed to fail, but a democratic political accommodation remains within reach. Overall, the difficulty experienced by the new regimes in forging political consensus has given the region’s remaining autocracies a boost of confidence.

In chapter 10, Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause III explain why the recent upheavals have shaken the region’s republics more deeply than its monarchies. Of the republics, only Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon passed through the period without seeing the top leader unseated or slipping into civil war. In contrast, although Bahrain experienced sustained mass mobilization, the seven other monarchies enjoyed relative quiet. This observation is puzzling, because in other regions of the world monarchy is an endangered species. Some have theorized that the survival of monarchies in the Arab world is guaranteed by some special cultural affinity for kingship; others have argued that monarchy is well positioned to survive mass uprisings because its leader sits far enough above the political fray to appear as a fair arbiter. Yom and Gause reject these theories. Arab monarchies have been overthrown in the past, and those that remain are not organic extensions of traditional rule but rather a result of installations by foreign powers. Little evidence supports the idea that Arabs prefer dynastic succession. Rather, Yom and Gause argue that political strategy and ample resource endowments saved the Arab monarchies from this round of uprisings. Unlike the overwhelmingly Sunni-supported Bahraini monarchy, most of the monarchies that survived the Arab Spring unchallenged had built coalitions spanning various identity groups. In each country, the work of building such a coalition was eased by oil wealth, foreign aid, or both. One implication

of this analysis is that these regimes are not as secure as they seemed while weathering the storm of the Arab uprisings in 2011 and 2012. An exogenous shock, such as a sharp drop in oil prices or in foreign aid, could upend their apparent stability.

In chapter 11, Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds also seek to explain the variation in regime outcomes—why dictators fell in only four of the fourteen authoritarian regimes of the region (their analysis excludes Lebanon and Iraq). They conclude that while the emergence of uprisings seemed randomly determined, their success or failure depended in each case on whether the government enjoyed enough “money and loyalty” to defeat its opponents. Regimes endowed with vast oil wealth have a greater capacity to employ the carrots and sticks necessary to stave off popular mobilization. Though “loyalty” is more difficult to measure than wealth, the authors identify the successful establishment of hereditary succession as a proxy variable for the cohesiveness that contributes to the capacity of a regime to survive an uprising. In each of the oil-poor, nonhereditary regimes that experienced large-scale protests—Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen—the leader of the regime was toppled. In those countries that experienced an uprising but also had oil wealth, a hereditary regime, or both—Bahrain, Libya, and Syria—the regime’s security forces backed their leader and carried out a violent crackdown. In Libya, the authors argue, the regime’s failure to crush its opponents stemmed not from a lack of cohesiveness, but rather from an inability to withstand NATO military intervention. Their conclusion suggests that those Arab regimes which escaped unscathed from the Arab Spring—all of which feature hereditary succession, vast oil or gas wealth, or both—will not easily give way before popular unrest.

Comparing the Arab Revolts

Next follows a series of five chapters based on articles originally written in 2011. Two of these explore the historical precedents for the kind of revolutionary “contagion” that spread so rapidly during the Arab Spring; each of the remaining three assesses a key factor influencing the success or failure of the uprisings. In chapter 12, Marc F. Plattner focuses on the international context of the Arab revolts, which erupted with great suddenness during a period of global democratic decline. Beginning around 2006, the number of countries around the world that qualified as democracies had begun to shrink, while nondemocratic countries had begun to exhibit new dynamism and to increase their cooperation with one another. As unrest rocked many Arab regimes in 2011, however, autocrats elsewhere were jolted from their growing self-confidence. It remains unclear whether the Arab upheavals will usher in a new era of democratic expansion or add up to no more than a short-lived deviation from an underlying trend of authoritarian revival. Plattner notes that the

challenges to democracy in places such as Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen are formidable, and that their progress toward democracy is far from assured. Yet even if the revolts of 2011 fail to culminate in functioning democracies, they may one day be remembered, like the failed revolutions of 1848 in Europe, as milestones on the road to a more democratic future.

In Chapter 13, Lucan Way focuses on the lessons that may be gleaned from the revolutions of 1989 in Europe. Like the upheavals in the Arab world in 2011, these revolutions surprised many observers, who had been confusing surface stability with basic sustainability. Both sets of events showed that uprisings against authoritarian systems can prove contagious by demonstrating to nearby nations the vulnerability of their own leaders and suggesting ways to remove them. Yet democracy cannot happen through diffusion alone. As Way argues, structural factors, including the regional balance of power, are often decisive. The degree of international support that an aspiring democratic regime receives can be a critical determinant of the success of a transition. In 1989, the precipitous decline of the Soviet Union stripped Central and East European autocrats of their chief external support. Arab authoritarians today face no comparable challenge.

Moreover, the Arab uprisings were not as unforgiving to autocrats as those of 1989, when Nicolae Ceaușescu, the only ruler to hold out against reform, paid for his resistance with his life. In contrast, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Ali Abdallah Saleh avoided such a brutal fate, perhaps suggesting to other Arab leaders that failure to reform need not be a deadly mistake. Even for those polities that succeed in toppling their dictators, the prospect of a Russia-like regression to authoritarianism looms. As Way writes, “people have short memories,” and intractable problems such as corruption, inflation, and unemployment make it almost inevitable that eventually “the old regime will look a lot better to a lot of people.” In the long run, the lessons of 1989 make it clear that key structural factors, especially levels of economic development and ties to the West, will go a long way toward determining the success or failure of the Arab uprisings. With the global economy sputtering and with political Islam perceived as a threat by Western leaders, Way concludes that “some form of authoritarianism is likely to dominate the Middle East and North Africa for a long time to come.”

Throughout the Arab world, militaries have been critical actors in postindependence politics. Indeed, for former military officers Ben Ali, Mubarak, Qadhafi, and Saleh, the path to power passed through the armed forces. Perhaps surprisingly, only two of these commanders enjoyed the widespread loyalty of their officers during their countries’ mass uprisings. In Chapter 14, Zoltan Barany examines why this was the case. Generally, Barany writes, a military’s decision about how to respond to an uprising is shaped by the regime’s track record of address-

ing citizens' grievances, its past treatment of the military, the degree of cohesion among the various security services, and the extent to which military leaders have perpetrated human-rights abuses. The probability of foreign intervention, the pressures of revolutionary diffusion, and the exposure of officers to Western education can also play a role in determining the military's stance. In Tunisia, Ben Ali had long treated his internal-security forces better than the military. Furthermore, Tunisia's army had a high level of professionalism, no tradition of mixing in politics, and a sizeable cadre of Western-trained officers. In Egypt, military leaders had long enjoyed tremendous economic privileges, but they felt threatened by the rise of Mubarak's son Gamal and by the swelling of the Interior Ministry, which came to employ as many as 1.4 million Egyptians. In Yemen and Libya, respectively, schisms in the armed forces sprang from fragmented societies themselves. Meanwhile, the Bahraini army—a Sunni force formed to protect a Sunni monarchy—loyally cracked down on mostly Shia protestors. And in Syria, the sectarian makeup of the officer corps, which is dominated by members of President Assad's minority Alawite sect, along with the copious opportunities for economic enrichment offered to officers, similarly engendered fealty. It remains to be seen how civil-military relations will evolve in the Arab world, especially as pressures grow to move away from statist economies, but absent greater civilian control of the armed forces, the prospects for democracy may be dim.

In chapter 15, John M. Carey and Andrew Reynolds examine the region's electoral systems as well as efforts made to reform them. Historically, Arab legislatures have been "dubiously representative, fecklessly indecisive, and weak in the face of powerful hereditary monarchs or strongman presidents." In Egypt and Tunisia prior to the uprisings, complex legal webs of quotas, classifications, and regulations ensured commanding majorities for Mubarak's and Ben Ali's ruling parties. In trying to build more democratic electoral systems, reformers must look to five key goals even while navigating the tensions and tradeoffs that will surely arise among them. The goals are 1) promoting inclusiveness that brings representation to new and previously marginalized groups; 2) avoiding distortions that give the leading party an outsized "winner's bonus"; 3) creating incentives for coalition-building; 4) encouraging accountability of individual legislators to voters; and 5) giving voters options in as straightforward a way as possible. Carey and Reynolds argue that the new electoral law adopted by Egypt in 2011 failed with regard to inclusiveness, minimization of distortions, and especially intelligibility to voters. They offer a much more positive assessment of the electoral law chosen by Tunisia for its constituent assembly, which measures up well on all criteria except that of strengthening the accountability of individual representatives to voters.

In chapter 16, Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain consider

the role played by digital media in fostering the Arab Spring. They argue that the rise of social media is critical in explaining how a group of “twenty-somethings with little experience in social-movement organizing” toppled regimes that had stood the tests of decades. The spread of these media preceded the Arab Spring. For years, Egyptian, Tunisian, and other Arab dissidents had been disseminating their opinions over the Internet. In both Tunisia and Egypt, social media allowed citizens to share the news of a martyred dissident crushed by the state (Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia and Khaled Said in Egypt) and generated a collective sense of outrage. In addition to galvanizing citizens, social media helped them to organize. When authorities tried to control or direct digital media, activists responded creatively: In Libya, some used dating websites to communicate; in Syria, they used Google Maps to distinguish authentic protests from regime-laid traps. Howard and Hussain note that these new tools may be employed in support of authoritarianism as well as democracy, and they caution that social media are still very much contested terrain. Yet, emphasizing how the Internet has changed the ways in which Arabs communicate with one another, they conclude that “social media have become the scaffolding upon which civil society can build.”

Tunisia and Egypt

The second part of our volume, which focuses on individual Arab countries, begins with two chapters on Tunisia and three on Egypt. In chapter 17, Peter J. Schraeder and Hamadi Redissi describe the stunning chain of events set in motion in December 2010 in Tunisia—“case zero” of the “Arab Spring”—when Bouazizi lit himself on fire after helplessly watching a police officer confiscate his meager capital. While Ben Ali’s fall after nearly a quarter-century in power surprised many, in retrospect his regime’s weaknesses appear painfully clear. Tunisia faced a number of structural challenges: Its economy struggled to meet the aspirations of those Tunisians—about two of every five—aged 25 years or less. Unemployment among educated young people perversely exceeded that of their less educated counterparts. In the wake of the global economic slowdown, making ends meet became even harder as food prices soared. Ben Ali had made the country a police state: With a population only a sixth the size of France’s, it had the same number of police officers. Elections, the constitution, and the legislature all bent to Ben Ali’s will, while his family crassly exploited a raft of privileges that enraged citizens at large. Yet despite the growing authoritarianism of Ben Ali’s regime, Tunisian civil society had become surprisingly strong. The number of civil society organizations had increased nearly fivefold under Ben Ali, and the rise of new media had helped them to grow stronger. The General Union of Tunisian

Workers had become an especially formidable organization. When Ben Ali tried to meet popular protests with force, the many frailties of his regime and the underlying strength of the society confronting it became apparent.

In chapter 18, Alfred Stepan examines Tunisia's early success in moving along a path of democratization. For Stepan, Tunisia's democratic progress stems in large measure from its embrace of the "twin tolerations." In Stepan's view, hard-line secularism on the model of France's *laïcité* or Turkey's Kemalism is not a prerequisite for democracy but in fact a hindrance to it. Stepan reports that Tunisia's embrace of the twin tolerations dated from well before the uprising against Ben Ali. As early as 2003, Tunisian dissidents from across the political spectrum began meeting and issuing declarations affirming democratic values. In tracing Tunisia's history, Stepan finds fertile soil for these values in a legacy of toleration that was suppressed by Ben Ali and his predecessor Habib Bourguiba (1957–87), who found intolerance toward religion useful for maintaining secular authoritarian rule. In charting a path beyond Ben Ali, Tunisian dissidents of many political stripes saw tolerance as a critical value binding them together. Challenges abound in Tunisia, but its more welcoming attitude toward the twin tolerations contrasts with the intolerance that is crippling Egypt's transition, and positions Tunisia as the Arab world's best bet for achieving the status of consolidated democracy.

In chapter 19, Tarek Masoud reconsiders the popular academic view of the Arab world as a bastion of "durable authoritarianism" in light of this view's failure to anticipate the Egyptian uprising. A stream of scholarly studies developed a theory of durable Arab authoritarianism in order to explain the survival and seeming resilience of a host of aging authoritarian systems in the region. In the process, the obvious shortcomings of these regimes were underrated. In the case of Egypt, Masoud notes that many identified Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and the rubber-stamp parliament that it dominated as pressure valves to let the steam out of the elite-level conflicts that often topple authoritarian regimes. While these institutions may have helped to prolong Mubarak's rule, once confronted with enough popular resentment they proved "far flimsier than previously thought" and quickly melted away. Sham elections may have served to reward regime elites, but they also fed frustration with the regime, and "parliament came to be seen as an abode of swindlers."

Similarly, building up the NDP may have allowed the regime to coopt more of the country's elites, but it also alienated the generals, who in the end were unwilling to fire their guns in defense of Mubarak. This reluctance was driven by the desire to eliminate civilian political competitors to military power in a country where Mubarak's son Gamal had seemed poised to become the first Egyptian president who had not served in

the military. Masoud cautions that while some of the remnants of the Mubarak regime were washed away, the power of the military might be more difficult to dislodge. In the end, he concludes that Egypt's ability to build a democracy will hinge in large part on its ability to reform its economy. "Nothing tests democratic commitments like an empty stomach," he writes. While recognizing Egypt's myriad challenges, Masoud calls for humility on the part of political analysts. After all, many who now read doom in Egypt's tarot cards once missed the one depicting the strongman falling from his throne.

Mubarak's tumble from power unleashed a contest between Egypt's Islamists and secularists. In chapter 20, Michele Dunne and Tarek Radwan, writing during the presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi, argue that despite the Islamists' initial electoral triumph, Egypt's liberals will continue to play a formidable role. "The long-smoldering tinder that set alight the Egyptian revolution" was Egyptian society's mounting consensus that all citizens have unalienable rights, including the right to select their political leaders, to enjoy the rule of law, and to remove from power leaders who have violated these rights. The rise of liberal groups such as Kifaya, the April 6th Movement, and the National Association for Change and their instrumental role in the uprising are well documented. Their ideas increasingly gained currency in the wider society, including among members of Hosni Mubarak's NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood. Even after crushing the liberals in elections, Islamists were constrained from repudiating the liberal message that had become an almost universal aspiration of Egyptians over the past decade. When President Morsi, backed into a corner by the military, the judiciary, and a host of political opponents, sought to immunize the Islamist-dominated constituent assembly from a possible judicial challenge, his decision was met by widespread protest. Dunne and Radwan conclude that "Egypt's liberals . . . remain the vanguard of change in the country."

While the future remains unknown, Egypt's initial attempt at a transition to democracy ended in failure with the military takeover that ousted President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013. In chapter 21, Nathan J. Brown traces Egypt's transformation from a possible model of Arab democracy to a cautionary tale. Brown contends that Egypt's descent into polarization, acrimony, and bloodshed was not inevitable. If a few events had turned out differently, Egyptians might have achieved the level of consensus required to keep the country's democratic hopes afloat. The original sin of the Egyptian uprising, according to Brown, was allowing the military to seize control of the transition. At no point could Egyptian political leaders agree on the rules of the game. In place of the negotiations needed to fashion a broad consensus, political leaders pursued their interests by "pressuring, nagging, and bargaining with the generals." The transition was filled with elections, but rather than imbuing

Egyptians with confidence, each resort to the ballot box seemed to pull political forces further apart. In the end, Egypt's political rift became a canyon: "Islamists plausibly charged non-Islamists with refusing to accept adverse election results, while non-Islamists plausibly charged Islamists with using those same election results to undermine the development of healthy democratic life."

The inadequacy of Egypt's political leadership is only part of the story. Just as important has been the gravitational pull of the country's authoritarian past. The repression perpetrated by Mubarak—and by Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956–70) and Anwar Sadat (1970–81) before him—left behind a political landscape tilted toward the Brotherhood, which for years had worked at building a robust social organization. After the uprising, the key actors in Egypt's authoritarian "republic" continued to recite their lines: Egypt's generals masqueraded as the vanguard of democracy; its police officers continued to prefer their institutional interests to the work of upholding public order; the judiciary used its powers to wage war on the executive and the legislature; and the media continued to amplify the partisan messages of those in power. Years of sham democracy had left Egyptians suspecting that democratic gestures masked insidious intentions. The failure of Egypt's transition will resound for years, Brown writes, and both Islamists and students of democracy everywhere will seek to derive lessons from it. But for Egypt, the tragic conclusion may be that "the very idea of democracy has lost much of its meaning and all of its luster."

Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain

The next set of chapters covers the four other Arab countries that experienced massive protests during the Arab spring. As April Longley Alley recounts in chapter 22, Ali Abdallah Saleh had been president of Yemen since its unification in 1990, but his regime—challenged by the Huthi insurgency in the north, a separatist movement in the south, and poverty and corruption throughout—was under siege prior to the Arab uprisings. The gravity of Yemen's problems spurred Yemeni leaders and the international community to work out a unique exit from the massive protests triggered by the Arab Spring: Saleh was pressured into relinquishing office, and the country's fractious elites achieved a negotiated settlement, including an agreement to participate in a formal national dialogue. In part, Saleh's downfall can be attributed to his propensity for rankling his allies by hoarding increasing wealth and power for his family at a time when a decline in oil production made rent-distribution more contentious.

In mid-2011, a standoff ensued between Saleh and some of his former allies. The settlement that ended the standoff has so far succeeded in steering Yemen away from the bloody path trodden by Libyans and

Syrians, and it has perhaps saved the country from the intensity of internal strife that Egypt has suffered. Yet because the settlement preserved the influence of key actors in Yemen's corrupt political system, the country runs the risk that its transition will amount to little more than a reshuffling of elites rather than systemic change. Meanwhile, amid the political vacuum that has followed the settlement, the security threats that challenged Saleh during the twilight of his rule have grown more dangerous and the humanitarian issues have become more intractable. Yemen has a potential opening through which greater democracy might be reached, but its path is fraught with challenges. As Alley writes, "At best, a long and tumultuous process of negotiation and change has begun."

Among the countries that deposed longtime rulers, Libya has experienced the most drastic change. Gone is the quixotic and brutal Muammar Qadhafi and his dysfunctional brand of personal rule. For the time being, Libyans are happy to have earned unprecedented freedom. Yet as Mieczysław P. Boduszyński and Duncan Pickard write in chapter 23, the obstacles to democracy are many, and citizens will not forever be content with a free but feckless state. Many of Libya's challenges stem from the legacy left behind by Qadhafi, a military coupmaker who ruled for more than four decades. Qadhafi salted the earth: In an alleged effort to minimize the distance between policy makers and the people, he deliberately undermined the effectiveness of state institutions, fostered discord among potential adversaries, prevented bonds from forming with the West, and presided over an economy consisting of little more than oil extraction and rent distribution.

In trying to address their country's many problems, Libya's new leaders and nascent institutions have achieved little progress, ironically placing them within the tradition of chaotic "governance" established by Qadhafi. Security problems have been the most vexing issue. Militias—many of whom fought in the country's civil war against Qadhafi—have refused to lay down their arms, especially in the absence of an effective national army. Meanwhile, as Libyan leaders try to set the country on a path toward devising a viable constitution, tension has grown among reformers who served in the Qadhafi government, Libyan expatriates who have returned since the revolution, and militia fighters who struggled against Qadhafi. Boduszyński and Pickard speculate that Islamist populism may become the broad basis for a new Libyan national identity, perhaps paving the way for stronger institutions. But they warn that the degree of democratic commitment harbored by Libya's Islamist populists remains the great unknown.

Syria's bloody conflict ranks as one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters in recent decades, and as Steven Heydemann writes in chapter 24, the flames of war have annealed the Assad regime into something even more authoritarian, repressive, and sectarian than it

was before 2011. These changes bode ill even for the country's longer-term democratic prospects. In addition to resorting to increasing brutality and leaning even more exclusively on the support of minority groups, Assad's regime has withdrawn from its recent embrace of market-oriented economic reform and has further deepened its strategic relationships with nondemocratic actors such as China, Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah. Of course, the possibility that Assad's regime might be defeated on the battlefield cannot be ruled out. But even if that should occur, some recent changes will not easily be undone. For example, the geographic segregation of the population has grown, reversing a trend of the past few decades in which Syria's various sectarian groups had dispersed throughout the country. Meanwhile, the peaceful protest movement that had emerged during the height of the Arab Spring has mutated into a "thoroughly militarized, militantly Islamist armed movement wracked by internal fissures and frictions, bereft of a coherent and effective political leadership." Like the hardening of the Assad regime, this development further clouds Syria's future prospects for democratization.

While the region's monarchies weathered the 2011 storm far better than its republics, the tiny island kingdom of Bahrain is a notable exception. In Bahrain, early 2011 protests swelled to include a large chunk of the populace. Yet thanks to splits in the opposition and the government's successful repression and countermobilization, the ruling Khalifa family avoided the fate that befell some other Arab leaders. As Frederic Wehrey writes in Chapter 25, the seeds of Bahrain's upheaval were planted far before the Arab Spring. Since taking the throne in 1999, King Hamad al-Khalifa had drained power from the elected parliament. Meanwhile, as a Shia-majority country with a Sunni ruling family, Bahrain saw its political tensions inflamed by the growing sectarianism of a region rent by the war in Iraq. When demonstrations—at first peaceful, largely nonsectarian, and limited in their aims—began in February 2011, the Kingdom responded with force, arresting, torturing, and killing demonstrators.

Since the beginning of the crackdown, Bahrain's key political groupings have been pulled further apart: Al-Wifaq, a moderate Shia formation that withdrew from parliament in protest of the crackdown, has been criticized by more militant Shia factions, and Sunni Islamists have divided into loyalist and oppositionist groups. Even the royal family is split between hard-liners and reformists. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, connected to Bahrain Island by a 25-kilometer causeway, continues to wield significant influence. In March 2011, it spearheaded the deployment of the GCC's multinational Peninsula Shield Force to help quell the uprising. More recently, it has sought to steer Bahrain back onto a path of "calibrated reform," trying to craft participatory institutions that can serve as safety valves without packing any real political power. As

Bahrain's elites try to restore a sense of normality, frustration continues to grow in many corners of the island.

Defusing the Protests

This book concludes with four chapters on countries that were able to defuse the protests generated by the Arab Spring. Algeria stands out as one of the few Arab republics to make it through the past few years largely unscathed. In Chapter 26, **Frédéric Volpi** writes that the Algerian regime outflanked its challengers by “decoupling social unrest from political mobilization.” Although Algeria never approached the level of protest seen in neighboring Tunisia, riots did break out there in early January 2011—weeks before the Egyptian uprising began—after the government tried to ease some price controls. Protests continued into February, but they never snowballed into an uprising. In part, this hesitance to push the country to the brink is connected to memories of the country's bloody civil war in the 1990s, which left the Algerian populace deeply wary of conflict. Furthermore, in 2011 leftist and liberal opposition groups generally refused to work with Islamists out of mistrust and a fear that such collaboration would trigger a brutal government crackdown. Also instrumental in the fizzling of antiregime mobilization were the containment strategies of the regime: “pseudodemocratization, redistributive patronage, and an effective use of the security apparatus.” Buoyed by its natural-gas wealth, the regime offered many carrots, including a massive increase in social spending. Much of this money flowed to members of the army and other security forces, making the prospect of a Tunisia-style outcome even more remote. The government also was quick to brandish its arms in the hope that it would not be forced to use them. At one rally, security personnel outnumbered protesters by 27,000. Through displays of overwhelming force, the regime avoided having to resort to a violent crackdown that might have generated a severe backlash.

When protests erupted in Morocco in early 2011, King Mohammed VI drew plaudits for his perceived conciliatory approach. The king offered a package of constitutional reforms to be decided by a referendum, and elections were held. Yet in chapter 27, Ahmed Benchemsi writes that the reform process praised by many Western observers was mainly a sleight of hand. Upon closer inspection, the notion that the king had relinquished his sacred status is far less clear than was reported by many in the Western media. Meanwhile, though much was made of the increased responsibility given to the parliament and prime minister, Benchemsi asserts that the new prime minister, Abdelilah Benkirane, will remain “a constitutional hostage of the monarchy.” The king retains the ability to legislate by royal decree; the electoral law prevents the rise of a political party with broad support; and the chief of government's

newfound ability to dissolve the parliament (after consultation with the king) amounts to little more than a freshly minted means of committing political suicide. Benchemsi credits the king's "clever preemptive move" with sucking the oxygen from the protest movement's balloon. In this respect, Mohammed VI, once hailed as part of a new generation of reform-minded Arab leaders, followed the playbook that his father, King Hassan II (r. 1961–99), had crafted: Curry favor abroad by projecting an image of openness and investing in clever public relations, sow division in opposition ranks, and use repression when necessary. Yet with many of the problems that stirred Moroccan protesters—corruption, unemployment, and political stagnation—remaining intractable, the current king's skill at political legerdemain may not suffice indefinitely. "A strong-enough wind," Benchemsi writes, "will disperse any smokescreen."

Like Morocco, Jordan's monarchy reacted to Arab Spring unrest with its usual response: promises of measured reform. But as Sean L. Yom writes in Chapter 28, this routine response to what was actually a historic swell in discontent may have been a major mistake on the part of the King Abdullah II. Yom argues that "the king has never faced such doubt about his future." Yet despite this unprecedented challenge, the "White Revolution" that King Abdullah has proclaimed merely reprises the old ruse of "controlled liberalization" and is not the more far-reaching democratization that Jordanians are demanding. The parliament that came in via the January 2013 elections still lacks the ability to initiate legislation, control the purse strings, or oversee the activities of the military or security forces.

Like its counterpart in Morocco, the Jordanian monarchy has been careful to craft an image that appeals to Western sensibilities. It has coupled its public-relations campaign with warnings regarding the alternatives to its continued rule: Jordan is constantly depicted as teetering on the brink of destruction, with the forces of Islamic fundamentalism or ethnic conflict ready to erupt should Abdullah lose control. Yet these perils are bogeymen, Yom contends, specters manipulated to suit the monarchy's needs. Democratization is likely to produce neither Islamic theocracy nor Palestinian ethnocracy. Opposition to the Hashemite monarchy transcends both the Islamist-secular and the Palestinian-East Banker divides. The Arab monarchies may have emerged intact from the Arab Spring, but Middle Eastern history suggests that they are far from immortal—such present-day republics as Egypt, Iraq, and Libya were once kingdoms. Thus the king would be wise to move Jordan sooner rather than later toward constitutional monarchy.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a still relatively closed society dominated by a condominium between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi brand of Islam. Despite its massive petrochemical endowment, the kingdom is beset by soaring youth unemployment, pervasive corruption, and

an aging ruling family increasingly out of touch with an enormous cohort of young people. In short, it suffers from many of the same ailments that brought untold numbers out into the streets in other parts of the Arab world. As Stéphane Lacroix chronicles in chapter 29, there was a period of brief but significant unrest in Saudi Arabia during the early months of the Arab Spring. In February 2011, a group of reformists who over the previous decade had begun issuing calls for a constitutional monarchy published a pair of petitions calling for political reform. In a country that ranks first in the world when it comes to the share of its populace that uses Twitter, an emerging generation of youth activists—including members of the religious *Sahwa* movement—used social media to call for demonstrations like those that had taken place in Tunisia and Egypt. And in the Eastern Province, home to much of Saudi Arabia's oil and most of its Shia minority, activists began to stage rallies, some calling for Shia rights and others calling for broader political reform.

Yet these rumblings never became an earthquake, as the Saudi regime neatly outflanked its opponents. Members of the official religious establishment, drawing upon the state's legitimacy as the guardian of "the two holy places" (the cities of Mecca and Medina), issued a *fatwa* against demonstrations. In late February and March, octogenarian King Abdullah announced a domestic-spending package benefiting youth and the poor, at a price tag that exceeded a fifth of annual GDP. Explicit warnings that the security forces would use force against demonstrators raised the barrier of fear, and those Saudis who might have sympathized with reformists mostly stayed home during what was billed on Facebook as a "Day of Anger." Lacroix concludes that, although Saudi Arabia survived this round of unrest, it would be a mistake to conclude that it is immune to future upheavals. The kingdom's ability to coopt support and dampen unrest hinges on continued high oil prices. Moreover, the regime's monopoly on religious legitimacy is increasingly subject to competition. Perhaps most important is the looming question of succession, as the set of elderly brothers who are sons of the founding king (Ibn Saud, d. 1953) finally passes completely from the scene and the next generation of major royals jockey for position. The uncertainty that this presages may well present reformists with opportunities such as have never been seen in Saudi history.

As these case studies show, the Arab uprisings have yet to produce a story with a happy ending. As of this writing, Tunisia appears to be the country with the best chance of completing a transition to democracy, but it still faces substantial obstacles. Yet the events that we have witnessed during the past three years constitute no more than a single episode in what is likely to be a long and continuing struggle. At the very least, the massively supported popular protests that erupted in 2011 have refuted the notion that Arab culture offers uniquely barren soil for otherwise universal human aspirations for democracy.

NOTES

1. An earlier *Journal of Democracy* book on the region, *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East*, was published in 2003.

2. *The Arab Human Development Report, 2002* (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2002), 2.

3. *Arab Human Development Report*, 114.

4. Daniel Brumberg, "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (October 2002): 56–68.

5. Arch Puddington, "The Freedom House Survey for 2012: Breakthroughs in the Balance," *Journal of Democracy* 24 (April 2013): 46–61; "The Freedom House Survey for 2011: The Year of the Arab Uprisings," *Journal of Democracy* 23 (April 2012): 74–88. In 2013, Freedom House also classified Libya as a democracy, but given the weakness of central state authority there, we regard that judgment as premature.

6. We regret the absence of a chapter on Iraq from this volume. Though the *Journal* has extensively covered Iraq in the past, our repeated efforts to recruit a new article on that country did not yield publishable results.